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ABSTRACT9
Exact analytic expressions are given to evaluate the reliability of systems consisting of compo-10
nents, connected in parallel or series, subject to imprecise failure distributions. We also proposed a11
simplified version of the first order reliability method to deal with imprecision. This development12
allows engineers to evaluate the reliability of systems without having to resort to optimisation13
techniques and/or Monte Carlo simulation. In addition, this framework does not need to assume a14
distribution for the epistemic uncertainty, which permits a robust analysis even with limited data.15
In this way, the approach removes a significant barrier to the modelling of epistemic uncertainties16
in industrial probabilistic safety analysis workflows.17
INTRODUCTION18
Probabilistic safety analysis (PSA) was first introduced in the 1970s as a means of establishing19
the probability of a certain amount of radiation release to the environment from a nuclear structure.20
It is perceived to address many of the weaknesses of deterministic analysis (Modarres and Kim21
2010). For example, deterministic analysis relies heavily on engineering conservatism which could22
be difficult to quantify in practice. In addition, it is not always clear what the most conservative23
value for a particular parameter is when performing a black box analysis.24
In recent years, techniques from the area of imprecise probability have been increasingly25
applied to Probabilistic Safety Analysis studies in academic literature (Karanki et al. 2009) (Beer26
and Patelli 2015). Imprecise probabilities offer a natural framework to model uncertainty due27
to lack of knowledge (epistemic uncertainty). Epistemic uncertainty is particularly important28
in the nuclear industry where there is often a lack of sufficient data to completely model relevant29
phenomena. This uncertainty can bemodelled as interval uncertainty in the parameters of traditional30
probability distributions, which is known as probability bounds analysis, where the imprecise31
distributions themselves are referred to as probability boxes (Ferson et al. 2003). This approach32
strikes a pragmatic compromise between engineering conservatism and overly optimistic analyses.33
However, the techniques proposed usually require sophisticated simulation techniques (Patelli 2016;34
Patelli et al. 2017a). For example, to propagate uncertainty through a complex black box model35
computationally expensive Monte Carlo or optimisation methods are used (Patelli et al. 2015).36
Although efficient simulation approaches for dealing with imprecision have recently been proposed37
(e.g. using Line Sampling (de Angelis et al. 2015), Subset simulation (Patelli et al. 2011) and tools38
to deal with probability boxes (Patelli et al. 2014; Patelli et al. 2017b; Faes et al. 2019)), their use39
in the nuclear industry is not yet widespread. In Ref. (Le Duy et al. 2010) recommendations are40
made for how available data can be used to define probability boxes. In Ref. (Qiu et al. 2008)41
approximate results were derived for structural systems where the First Order Reliability Method42
(FORM) could be applied. In the United States the nuclear regulator (Budnitz et al. 1985) refers43
to the work of Kennedy who provides many analytic relationships to establish the fragility curve44
for a containment with a conventional probabilistic treatment (Kennedy et al. 1980). The effect of45
epistemic uncertainty in PSA with conventional probability was considered in (Prinja et al. 2017;46
Sun and Yao 2008).47
In (conventional) structural probabilistic safety analysis often the relations used are simple48
analytic expressions which, in contrast to the methods based on imprecise probability, allow the49
failure probability of the system to be computed with no Monte Carlo simulation at all. This offers50
two significant advantages. Firstly, the computational time required to complete the calculations51
is greatly reduced, which allows projects to be completed on shorter timescales and less money to52
be spent on High Performance Computing. Secondly, the time of engineers is saved as they are53
not required to spend large amounts of time programming Monte Carlo simulations, which reduces54
expenditure for their employer, and consequently benefits the industry as a whole.55
In this paper, we will propose imprecise probabilistic analogues to many of the probabilistic56
formulae proposed in Kennedy’s paper which have become standard expressions used in proba-57
bilistic safety analysis. In this way, we hope to unite the conventional literature which is applied58
to PSA in industry with relatively recent developments in imprecise probability. The analysis will59
make extensive use of the probability boxes introduced in probability bounds theory. We will60
demonstrate how to establish the fragility curve of a system when components are connected in61
parallel or series, and when the failures of the components may have unknown dependencies. We62
will demonstrate how to establish a probability box fragility curve when the product of random63
variables must be considered. Then, we will also demonstrate how this can be used to calculate64
the failure probability when there is additional imprecision in the load distribution. We will also65
consider the implications of the imprecise First Order Reliability Method (FORM), and show how66
we can analytically obtain results from a simplified calculation when the exact reliability index67
is difficult to obtain. All of the above are particularly useful when combined with an event tree68
to e.g. yield the expected radiation release to the environment or to calculate the reliability of69
complex plant. The proposed approach considers only independence of components or complete70
lack of information on dependence. In fact, the framework of imprecise probability enables the71
consideration of correlations between events, for example via convex sets or copula functions. This72
would be a useful future generalisation of the work in this paper, as any additional information73
available will allow the bounds on the probability of failure to be tightened.74
The merit of this approach is that the entire fragility curve can be constructed by one analyst75
using conventional spreadsheet packages, without the requirement to use complicated simulation76
techniques which would require large amounts of time spent programming by the analyst. Therefore77
the benefits of traditional PSA approaches are retained whilst also obtaining the advantages of using78
probability bounds theory.79
In Section 2 an brief overview is presented of a typical PSA calculation used to determine the80
fragility curve of a system. In Section 3 we propose analogues to the expressions from Section81
2 using probability bounds analysis. In Section 4 a simple example is presented. In Section 482
we show how similar methods can be applied to obtain partial information about a more complex83
system. In Section 5 a brief summary is given.84
PROBABILISTIC SAFETY ANALYSIS85
Probabilistic safety analysis is broken down into three levels. Level 1 PSA studies the reactor86
and determines accident sequences which are likely to result in a release from the reactor pressure87
vessel. Level 2 considers the containment structure, and how likely this is to fail in an accident. This88
is done by creating a fragility curve for the containment, which quantifies the failure probability at89
a particular load. Level 3 PSA combines the information produced by level 1 and level 2 PSA to90
provide the probability of radiation release to the environment (Commission et al. 2005).91
In PSA level 2 the main goal is to establish the fragility curve of a (nuclear) structure (Pellissetti92
et al. 2017). In seismic hazard analysis the fragility curve expresses the failure probability of the93
structure as a function of the peak ground acceleration. This can then be used to conduct safety94
analysis once the conditions inside the reactor (the ‘source term’) and the external conditions are95
known (Sundararajan 2012).96
The fragility of a system is its probability of failure conditioned on a particular load. Therefore,97
in the context of this section of the paper, bounds on failure probabilities may be taken as bounds98
on fragilities. For a system, S, of components, ci, connected in series (i.e. the system will fail if one99
component fails) the fragility of the system, f (s |a), at a damage measure a (i.e. the peak ground100
acceleration) is given by101
f (s |a) = 1 −
∏
ci⊂S
[1 − f (ci |a)], (1)102
when the fragilities of the individual components are independently distributed (Kennedy et al.103
1980).104
If the dependence is not known then the value of f (s |a) given by Eqn. (1) is an upper bound105
which, for the small probabilities relevant to this type of analysis, approaches the value given by106
the more general Boole’s inequality, in what is known as the rare event approximation (Collet107
1996). Boole’s inequality can be used to calculate an upper bound on the probability that at least108
one event from a set of events occurs, i.e. the probability that a series system fails, when the109
dependence between different events is unknown. The Fréchet inequalities are similar upper and110
lower bounds that apply to the union and intersection of events when no information is available111
about the dependence of events (Rüschendorf 1991).112
Boole’s inequality is equal to the right hand side of the Fréchet inequality for the upper bound113
of the union of n events:114
max(P(A1), ..., P(An)) ≤ P *,
n⋃
i=1
Ai+- ≤ min(1, P(A1) + ... + P(An)). (2)115
The other Fréchet inequality (which applies for components connected in parallel) being116
max(0, P(A1) + ... + P(An) − (n − 1)) ≤ P *,
n⋂
i=1
Ai+- ≤ min(P(A1), ..., P(An)). (3)117
Note that both Boole’s inequality and the Fréchet inequalities are conservative bounds which should118
be used when the dependence between failure events is unknown.119
If the fragilities of the components are independently distributed and the components are120
connected in parallel (i.e. the system has redundancy and fails if every component fails) then the121
system’s fragility is given by122
f (s |a) =
∏
ci⊂S
[ f (ci |a)], . (4)123
If the dependence between component fragilities is not known then the value of f (s |a) given124
by Eqn. (4) is an upper bound (Kennedy et al. 1980). These formulae can also be applied to125
connected systems which form super systems, in which case the unknown dependence versions on126
the equations should be used (Kennedy et al. 1980).127
In probabilistic safety analysis f (ci |a) is usually modelled as a log normally distributed random128
variable, because the physical quantities being modelled must be greater than zero, i.e.129
f (ci |a) = φ
*.....,
log
(
a
βi
)
σi
+/////-
, (5)130
where βi represents the median failure value and σi is the logarithmic standard deviation of131
component ci, and φ is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of a standard normal variable.132
Typically in probabilistic safety analysis aleatory uncertainty can be distinguished from epistemic133
uncertainty by modelling the β for any particular component as a lognormally distributed random134
variable with parameters βe and σe. Hence the outer distribution (i.e. Eqn. (5), with logarithmic135
standard deviation σa) will describe aleatory uncertainty, and epistemic uncertainty is modelled by136
the nested distribution (i.e. the inner distribution, the CDF over β, with parameters βe and σe).137
In order to allow this model to be used for computation, typically the mean distribution is ob-138
tained (more widely known as the ‘composite’ distribution), which is also log-normally distributed.139
This is an averaged distribution obtained by combining the aleatory uncertainty (i.e. σa from the140
outer distribution) and the epistemic uncertainty (our uncertainty in the distribution parameters,141
σe) (Kim et al. 2010). For the composite distribution, the logarithmic standard deviation, σc, is the142
euclidean norm of the two lognormal logarithmic standard deviations, i.e. σc =
√
σ2a + σ
2
e and the143
median is simply the median of the inner (epistemic) distribution, βc = βe (a detailed derivation144
is provided in Ref. (Kaplan et al. 1994)). This distribution is assumed to be conservative, since it145
approaches the asymptotic values in the tails of the distributions described by the extrema of the146
epistemic distribution (Kennedy et al. 1980). However, in many cases there may be insufficient147
data to truly know that our epistemic uncertainty is log-normally distributed.148
Figure 1 shows an example of a composite distribution compared to the median fragility curve149
and the 5th and 95th percentiles of the epistemic uncertainty. As discussed, the mean curve150
approaches the extreme outer distributions’ tails (obtained by taking β from the 5th and 95th151
percentiles of the nested epistemic distribution and σ = σa). Clearly the median curve could not152
be used for this purpose as it does not adequately describe the range of our belief in the peak ground153
acceleration.154
PROBABILITY BOUNDS ANALYSIS155
Fragility Curve156
Let us consider the fragility distribution for a general component given by Eqn. (1). Instead of157
considering βi as a random variable and finding the composite distribution we will instead consider158
uncertainty in βi and σi as intervals. This enables the random variables to be converted into159
probability boxes, since probability boxes are nothing more than cumulative distribution functions160
with interval imprecision on the distribution parameters. This framework is attractive for several161
reasons. Firstly, we do not need to assume a distribution for our epistemic uncertainty, which162
permits a robust analysis even with limited data. Secondly, instead of having to find the composite163
distribution we can simply find the envelope of our distributions. Note that uniform distributions164
are conceptually different from interval incertitude, since a uniform distribution specifies that each165
value in the support of the distribution is equally likely, whereas an interval describes lack of166
knowledge in a set-like manner, without implications for the likelihood of different elements within167
the set. Furthermore, note that using probability distributions to represent epistemic uncertainty168
has been shown to have undesirable consequences (Balch 2016) (Balch et al. 2017).169
In Appendix I we show that if βi ∈ [βi, βi] and σi ∈ [σi, σi] then the distributional probability170
box can be converted to a distribution free probability box where the upper bound of the fragility171
is given by172
f (ci |a) = φ
*.......,
log *, aβi +- −
log *, aβi +-

2σi
+
log *, aβi +- +
log *, aβi +-

2σi
+///////-
, (6)173
174
and the lower bound of the fragility is given by175
f (ci |a) = φ
*.....,
log
(
a
βi
)
+
log
(
a
βi
) 
2σi
+
log
(
a
βi
)
−
log
(
a
βi
) 
2σi
+/////-
, (7)176
177
where the | · | operator represents the absolute value of a quantity. These bounds are shown in178
Figure 2. In general converting distributional probability boxes to distribution free probability boxes179
results in loss of information (Alvarez et al. 2017). However, in this case Eqn. (6) and Eqn. (7)180
are a result of taking the natural extension of Eqn. (5) and therefore the values obtained will be the181
tightest bounds possible, so in the specific case of Eqn. (6) and Eqn. (7) there is no consequence182
to making the conversion. The other results in this section provide the tightest possible bound in183
the case of unknown dependence, since we simply apply a Fréchet inequality. Note that the other184
results in the paper, after this section, do not make use of the conversion used in this section, in185
order to avoid the potential information loss.186
For systems containing components in series or parallel, when the component failures are known187
to be independent, the fragility can be calculated by using Eqn. (1) and Eqn. (4), respectively.188
Alternatively, if the failure dependence is unknown we can use the relevant Fréchet inequality,189
Eqns. (2) and (3), to yield the fragility. Alternatively, in the case of unknown failure dependence,190
the rare event approximation (described in Section 2) can be used to justify the application of191
Eqn. (1) and Eqn. (4) which will be accurate in the tails of the distributions (i.e. for rare events).192
Therefore, using the natural interval extension of Eqn. (2) with Eqn. (6) and Eqn. (7) it can be193
shown that, for components in series, the probability of failure at a particular ground motion, a,194
with certainty falls in the interval given by195
f (s |a) ∈
maxi
[
f (ci |a)
]
,min (1,
n∑
i=1
[
f (ci |a)
]
)
 , (8)196
i.e.
f (s |a) ∈

max
i

φ
*.....,
log
(
a
βi
)
+
log
(
a
βi
) 
2σi
+
log
(
a
βi
)
−
log
(
a
βi
) 
2σi
+/////-

,
min
*.......,
1,
n∑
i=1

φ
*.......,
log *, aβi +- −
log *, aβi +-

2σi
+
log *, aβi +- +
log *, aβi +-

2σi
+///////-

+///////-

. (9)
Product of log-normally distributed random variables197
Often the fragility curve for a component must be established by considering the product of a198
number of random variables with lognormal distributions. If this is the case then the probability199
bounds analysis approach can be extended to allow us to find the relevant fragility curve. To200
demonstrate, consider a general random variable d which is given by the product of other random201
variables, i.e.202
d = q
arbs
ct
, (10)203
where a, b and c are lognormal random variables and q, r , s and t are constants. It is clear that204
d will be lognormally distributed with median βd = q
βra β
s
b
βtc
, and logarithmic standard deviation205
σ2d = r
2σ2a + s
2σ2b + t
2σ2c (Kennedy et al. 1980).206
In the case of interval imprecision in the distribution parameters of a, b and c we can obtain207
βd = q ·
βra · βsb
βt
c
, (11)208
and209
βd = q ·
βra · βsb
βtc
, (12)210
by using the endpoint formulae for interval multiplication (Moore et al. 2009) with knowledge of211
the support of the distribution parameters. The logarithmic standard deviation can be obtained212
from213
σ2d = r
2σ2a + s
2σ2b + t
2σ2c, (13)214
and215
σ2d = r
2σ2a + s
2σ2b + t
2σ2c, (14)216
by taking the interval extension of the expression stated above for the case of no interval imprecision.217
This is principally of use when computing the response factor, F, which can be expressed as the218
product of a number of response factors applying to different pieces of equipment and processes (for219
example damping effects or modelling effects), i.e. F =
∏
i Fi. The Fi are modelled as lognormal220
random variables and may have interval imprecision in the median (Sundararajan 2012).221
Failure Probability222
Consider a systemwhich fails when the load exceeds the strength. For a general load distribution223
the failure probability is given by224
P f = −
∫ ∞
0
dH (a)
da
f (s |a)da, (15)225
where H (a) is the seismic hazard curve (i.e. the probability that the ‘load’ exceeds a certain value226
in a particular unit of time, which usually takes the form of the complement of a CDF since it must227
be monotonically decreasing, and the probability cannot exceed 1) (American Society of Civil En-228
gineers 2005). When H (a) and f (s |a) are both log normally distributed, it is simple to solve229
Eqn. (15) by transforming the integral (Kapur and Lamberson 1977). However, in general this230
integral is not solvable analytically and it cannot be solved analytically when the fragility curve is231
replaced with the distribution free probability boxes derived in the previous section.232
Therefore to derive bounds on the failure probability of systems subject to distributional proba-233
bility box loads and fragilities we will apply Fréchet bounds and interval arithmetic to well known234
results obtained by solving Eqn. (15) for common probability distributions.235
For example consider the case where the probability distribution function of the load, dH (a)da ,236
is log-normally distributed with parameters βl and σl and the fragility, f (s |a), is lognormally237
distributed with parameters βi and σi. In this case, the failure probability can be evaluated as238
P f = φ
*..,−
log βi − log βl√
σ2i + σ
2
l
+//- . (16)239
A plot of distributions used in Eqn. (16) with example parameters is shown in Figure 3.240
To calculate an upper bound on the failure probability for a series system we evaluate the241
maximum and minimum of Eqn. (16) with βl ∈ [βl, β¯l], σl ∈ [σl, σ¯l], βi ∈ [βi, β¯i], σi ∈ [σi, σ¯i]242
and Eqn. (2). Analogously, for components in parallel a similar result can be obtained fromEqn. (3).243
For simple systems these bounds provide useful analytic quantification of the reliability of the244
system under epistemic uncertainty. However, for more complex systems the bounds are usually245
not analytically calculable and hence numerical integration may be necessary (e.g. (Samaniego246
2007), (Patelli et al. 2017b), (Feng et al. 2016)).247
It is likely that there is uncertainty in βl and σl . If this is the case then the analysis can be made248
robust using an uncertainty quantification approach for the load distribution which is analogous to249
the approach used for the fragility.250
In some works, such as ASCE 43-05 (Braverman et al. 2007), the hazard curve has been251
modelled as a power law, since this is a good approximation to the Cauchy-Pareto complementary252
cumulative distribution function (Kennedy 2011). Such an equation takes the form of253
H (a) = k1a−KH, (17)254
where k1 and KH are positive fitted constants. KH represents the slope of the mean seismic hazard255
curve when plotted on log-log scale. With a log-normal fragility in the parametrisation used in this256
paper, the failure probability for a single component is given by257
P f = H (βi) exp
(KHσi)2
2
. (18)258
A plot of distributions used in Eqn. (18) with example parameters is shown in Figure 4.259
When there is interval imprecision in KH , k1, βi and σi we can obtain bounds on the failure260
probability, and this result can be generalised trivially to the case of a parallel or series system261
using the formulae given in Section 2.262
Summary of Failure Probability expressions263
In order to facilitate the efficient use of this paper, this section provides a list of results which264
can be derived from the previous section. Derivations for these results are provided in Appendix I.265
• Parallel System with unknown dependence; Lognormal load and Strength:266
P f =
∑
ci⊂S
min
φ
*..,−
log βi − log βl√
σ2i + σ¯
2
l
+//- , φ
*..,−
log βi − log β¯l√
σ2i + σ¯
2
l
+//-
 − (n − 1) (19a)
and
P f = min
ci⊂S
max
φ
*..,−
log βi − log βl√
σ2i + σ
2
l
+//- , φ
*..,−
log βi − log βl√
σ2i + σ
2
l
+//-

 (19b)
267
• Series system with unknown dependence; Lognormal load and Strength:
P f =
∑
ci⊂S
max
φ
*..,−
log βi − log β¯l√
σ¯2i + σ¯
2
l
+//- , φ
*..,−
log βi − log β¯l√
σi2 + σ
2
l
+//-
 (20a)
and
P f = max
ci⊂S
min
φ
*..,−
log β¯i − log βl√
σ¯2i + σ¯
2
l
+//- , φ
*..,−
log β¯i − log βl√
σi2 + σ
2
l
+//-

 (20b)
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• Series system with independent components (upper bound also valid for dependant rare
events); Log-normal load and strength:
P f = 1 −
∏
ci⊂S
1 −max
φ
*..,−
log βi − log β¯l√
σ¯2i + σ¯
2
l
+//- , φ
*..,−
log βi − log β¯l√
σi2 + σ
2
l
+//-

 (21a)
and
P f = 1 −
∏
ci⊂S
1 −min
φ
*..,−
log β¯i − log βl√
σ¯2i + σ¯
2
l
+//- , φ
*..,−
log β¯i − log βl√
σi2 + σ
2
l
+//-

 (21b)
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• Parallel system (independent components - upper bound also valid for dependant rare
events); Log-normal load and strength
P f =
∏
ci⊂S
min
φ
*..,−
log β¯i − log β¯l√
σ¯2i + σ¯
2
l
+//- , φ
*..,−
log β¯i − log β¯l√
σi2 + σ¯
2
l
+//-
 (22a)
and
P¯ f =
∏
ci⊂S
max
φ
*..,−
log βi − log βl√
σ¯2i + σ
2
l
+//- , φ
*..,−
log βi − log βl√
σi2 + σ
2
l
+//-
 (22b)
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• Single Component; Power Law Load, with k1 ∈ [k1, k¯1] and KH ∈ [KH, K¯H]; Lognormal,
with median β ∈ [β, β¯] and logarithmic standard deviation σ ∈ [σ, σ¯]:
P¯ f = k¯1 max
β−K¯H exp (K¯H σ¯)
2
2
, β−KH exp
(KH σ¯)
2
2
 (23a)
and conservative lower bound
P f = k1 β¯
−K¯H exp
(KHσ)
2
2
(23b)
If KH > log β¯σ2 or K¯H <
log β
σ¯2
a tighter lower bound is obtained from:
P f = k1 min
 β¯−KH exp
(
KHσ
)2
2
, β¯−K¯H exp
(
K¯Hσ
)2
2
 (23c)
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• Parallel system with unknown dependence; Power Law Load, with k1 ∈ [k1, k¯1] and
KH ∈ [KH, K¯H] Lognormal, with median βi ∈ [βi, β¯i] and logarithmic standard deviation
σi ∈ [σi, σ¯i]:
P¯ f = k¯1 min
ci⊂S
max
β−K¯Hi exp (K¯H σ¯i)
2
2
, β
−KH
i exp
(KH σ¯i)
2
2

 (24a)
and
P f = k1
∑
ci⊂S
 β¯i−K¯H exp
(KHσi)
2
2
 − (n − 1) (24b)
• Series system with unknown dependence; Power Law Load, with k1 ∈ [k1, k¯1] and KH ∈
[KH, K¯H] Log-normal, with median βi ∈ [βi, β¯i] and logarithmic standard deviation σi ∈
[σi, σ¯i]:
P¯ f = k¯1
∑
ci⊂S
max
β−K¯Hi exp (K¯H σ¯i)
2
2
, β
−KH
i exp
(KH σ¯i)
2
2
 (25a)
and
P f = k1 maxci⊂S
 β¯i−K¯H exp
(KHσi)
2
2
 (25b)
• Parallel system with independent components ( upper bound also valid for dependant rare
events); Power Law Load, with k1 ∈ [k1, k¯1] and KH ∈ [KH, K¯H]; Log-normal, with median
βi ∈ [βi, β¯i] and logarithmic standard deviation σi ∈ [σi, σ¯i]:
P¯ f =
∏
ci⊂S
k1 max
β−K¯Hi exp (K¯H σ¯i)
2
2
, β
−KH
i exp
(KH σ¯i)
2
2
 (26a)
and
P f =
∏
ci⊂S
k¯1 β¯i
−K¯H exp
(KHσi)
2
2
(26b)
• Series system with independent components (upper bound also valid for dependant rare
events); Power Law Load, with k1 ∈ [k1, k¯1] and KH ∈ [KH, K¯H]; Log-normal, with
median βi ∈ [βi, β¯i] and logarithmic standard deviation σi ∈ [σi, σ¯i] :
P¯ f = 1 −
∏
ci⊂S
1 − k¯1 max
β−K¯Hi exp (K¯H σ¯i)
2
2
, β
−KH
i exp
(KH σ¯i)
2
2

 (27a)
and
P f = 1 −
∏
ci⊂S
1 − k1 β¯i−K¯H exp
(KHσi)
2
2
 (27b)
Imprecise FORM272
The failure probability of a structural system calculated by Eqn. (15) can be approximated by273
P f = φ(−β), using the well known FORM approximation, where β is the reliability index. The274
reliability index can be obtained from275
β =
µS − µL
σ2L + σ
2
S
, (28)276
where µS and µL are the mean values of the strength and load and σL and σS are the standard277
deviations of the strength and load. Note that the FORM approximation holds exactly for linear278
limit state functions with normally distributed strength and load, but is only an approximation when279
the mean and standard deviations of other distributions are used.280
In (Qiu et al. 2008) this is extended to the case of probability box random variables, so that281
P¯ f = φ(−β) and P f = φ(− β¯) where282
β¯ =
µ¯S − µL
σL2 + σS2
, (29)283
and284
β =
µ
S
− µ¯L
σ¯2L + σ¯
2
S
. (30)285
In more complex cases one may need to use optimisation to find the reliability index using286
methods derived from the Hasofer-Lind method (Jiang et al. 2017). For example, one could287
imagine a system which fails if the sum of many different products of probability box distributed288
variables falls below a threshold. However, even in these cases, we can attempt to analyse in which289
conditions the system is likely to fail using a simple analytical method.290
Consider a load term which is the product of a constant and a random variable, i.e. L = CLd ,291
where C is a constant and Ld is a random variable representing the design load. The system will292
have a P f = 0.5 when β = 0, which implies the strength to load ratio, γ = µSµL , will be equal to 1.293
Clearly, this is only the case when C = γd = µSµLd , i.e. the applied load is scaled by the strength to294
design load ratio (Prinja et al. 2017).295
This can be trivially extended in the case of probability box variables to find an interval load296
for which P f = 0.5, i.e. L0.5 ∈ [L0.5, L¯0.5] = [γdLd, γ¯dLd, ] where297
γ¯d =
µ¯S
µ
Ld
, (31)298
and299
γ
d
=
µ
S
µ¯Ld
. (32)300
Note that the standard deviation of the random variables is not involved in the calculation of301
this load.302
ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES303
Reliability analysis of a simple concrete containment304
To demonstrate the results described in the previous sections wewill consider amodified version305
of an example given in (Modarres et al. 2016) with interval imprecision in the coefficient of variation306
of the random variables. The random variables will be modelled with lognormal distributions since307
lognormal distributions are commonly used to model physical quantities which must always be308
positive in the probabilistic safety analysis literature (Sundararajan 2012), (Kennedy et al. 1980).309
However note our approach could be applied to similar problems with different distribution types,310
andmany other distributions exist to ensure positivity of randomvariables. The problem description311
will be briefly replicated in this section for clarity.312
A concrete containment is a structure designed to prevent radioactive release from nuclear313
power plants to the environment. It is therefore important that the reliability of this structure can314
be determined accurately, as failing to do so could have severe consequences for the environment315
and the general public. During the process of determining the reliability of a containment, engi-316
neers wish to determine the relationship between applied pressure and failure probability of the317
containment. A simplified performance function is used to perform reliability analysis without318
having to run simulations on a complex finite element model. This approach is advantageous as the319
computational time required is significantly reduced. The approach assumes that the system will320
fail if the load is larger than the strength.321
The containment’s strength is considered to be divided between 7 failure mode contributors, all322
of which may cause system failure. Therefore, this example can be treated as a system composed323
of 7 components (which are modelled as random variables), connected in series.324
The probability of failure for the containment is given by325
P f =
∫
St<Lt
f (x)dx, (33)326
where f (x) is the joint probability distribution function of the random variables, x = (x1, x2...) and327
St and Lt represent the strength and load terms respectively. The input parameter values assumed328
in this analysis were taken approximately from the original example (Modarres et al. 2016), but329
modified to fit lognormal variables and include some imprecision as shown in Table 1. The pressure330
load inside the containment, for the specific accident being considered, was taken to be lognormally331
distributed with mean 0.575 MPa and standard deviation of 0.117 MPa (such that the parameters332
for the fitted lognormal distribution were log β = −0.5737 MPa and σ = 0.2014 MPa).333
The fragility of the series system was bounded using Eqn. (9) and compared to the empirical334
CDFs obtained by randomly sampling the epistemic uncertainty. The results are shown in Figure 5.335
The failure probability was calculated using Eqn. (20), since the dependence between failure336
modes was unknown. This resulted in a failure probability between 0.0086 and 0.0123, which337
contains the precise probability of failure (P f = 0.0122) given in (Modarres et al. 2016). This338
result was verified by use of double loop Monte Carlo simulation, which was performed using the339
same samples used to generate Figure 5 (100 epistemic samples and 1000 aleatory samples). The340
analytic code took 0.027 seconds to run, whilst the double loop Monte Carlo simulation took 0.16341
seconds to run on an 2.9 GHz Intel Core i5 processor inMatlab. In addition the result from double342
loop Monte Carlo simulation would require more samples, and hence even greater time, to increase343
accuracy in the tails of the p-box to an arbitrary amount already achieved by the analytic approach.344
These results reveal a good agreement with the expensive simulation procedures in a fraction345
(one fifth) of the time. Note that although in this case the double loop Monte Carlo was quick to346
run, this may not be true in general (such as in high dimensional cases). In addition, the Monte347
Carlo simulation could be one nested component in a much larger computation. Even when this348
is not the case, it is unrealistic to expect practising engineers to resort to double loop Monte Carlo349
simulation for what should be a simple design calculation, even with the inclusion of epistemic350
uncertainty. In practical cases it would also be necessary to consider uncertainty in the Logarithmic351
Mean of the random variables which can be easily accounted for given the developments in Section352
3.353
Containment with Additive Component Strengths354
In many real systems the components’ strengths may be added together, rather than combined355
in parallel or series. Such an example is given in (Prinja et al. 2017). This poses a challenge356
for analytical methods, as in general normal distributions and log normal distributions cannot be357
summed easily (except in limited cases such as independently distributed normal random variables).358
Therefore, in order to consider such systems in the imprecise PSA framework, we resort to using359
the imprecise FORM approximations given in (Qiu et al. 2008).360
A pre-stressed concrete containment is a concrete structure designed to prevent the release of361
radiation from the core of a nuclear reactor to the environment. The structural reliability analysis362
of pre-stressed concrete containments is a key component of level 2 PSA.363
In (Prinja et al. 2017) probabilistic safety analysis of a concrete containment was presented364
as part of a round robin international test exercise. Two experimental test cases (Sandia National365
Laboratories and Bhabha Atomic Research Centre) are described and the probability of failure for366
each containment is calculated. The experiments are compared to a cylindrical concrete containment367
model, where the area and strength of the concrete, rebar, tendons and liner aremodelled as normally368
distributed random variables. In this study, we will focus on the SNL containment, but add some369
epistemic uncertainty to the random variables. This epistemic uncertainty could represent lack of370
knowledge about the materials used for yield values, or lack of knowledge about the design being371
considered for geometric properties. The modified properties of the Sandia National Laboratories372
containment are summarised in Table 2.373
The performance function of the containment is obtained as a load-strength relationship, i.e.374
g = (AsFs + AtFt + AlFl + AcFc) − PR. (34)375
We set the applied pressure to be equal to the design pressure, scaled by a constant.376
Using the strength to design load ratio method from Eqn. (31) and Eqn. (32) with377
µ¯S
µ
L
=
µ¯As µ¯Fs + µ¯At µ¯Ft + µ¯Ac µ¯Fc + µ¯Al µ¯Fl
µ
Pd
µR
(35)378
and379
µ
S
µ¯L
=
µ
As
µ
Fs
+ µ
At
µ
Ft
+ µ
Ac
µ
Fc
+ µ
Al
µ
Fl
µ¯Pd µ¯R
(36)380
we find that P f = 0.5 when P ∈ [5.2Pd, 5.24Pd]. In order words, because of our epistemic381
uncertainty in the structural properties of the system we are unsure which pressure causes P f = 0.5.382
Clearly the epistemic uncertainty we have considered does not significantly change the pressure at383
which P f = 0.5.384
For a more complete understanding of the system (i.e. understanding which pressures cause385
large and small failure probabilities) advanced simulation methods would be necessary. This is386
because the strength to design-load ratio method only considers the mean values of the random387
variable in order to find the pressure at which the structure has P f = 0.5, and does not consider388
the variability of the structural components. For example, one could resort to the method proposed389
in Ref. (de Angelis et al. 2015), where line sampling is applied to structures with epistemic390
uncertainties.391
CONCLUSIONS392
In this paper, we have demonstrated methods to analytically propagate probability boxes in393
commonly used probabilistic safety analysis equations. These equations include series and par-394
allel systems with unknown dependencies, lognormal fragility distributions and equations where395
lognormally distributed factors are multiplied. In addition, Power Law Load load distributions are396
considered. Crucially, we use intervals to model epistemic uncertainty in the parameters of these397
distributions. This enables the robust quantification of epistemic uncertainty when performing398
probabilistic safety analysis, particularly in an industrial context. These distributions are sufficient399
for the analysis of many industrial problems, but in general the imprecise probability methods400
proposed could be generalised to other distributions as well.401
These expressions are imprecise probabilistic analogues to many of the probabilistic formulae402
proposed in Kennedy’s paper (Kennedy et al. 1980), which have become standard expressions used403
in probabilistic safety analysis. We also demonstrate how similar techniques can be applied to404
simplified calculations involving more complex models.405
Our proposed expressions enable engineers to complete essential design calculations whilst406
considering epistemic uncertainty, and avoid the impracticalities of double loop Monte Carlo407
simulation which we believe is a significant barrier to the modelling of epistemic uncertainty in408
many industrial probabilistic safety assessment workflows.409
APPENDIX I. PROOFS410
Proof of Eqns. (6) and (7)411
Firstly, note that φ is a monotonic function of its arguments, so finding the maxima and412
minima of Eqn. (5) is reduced to finding the maxima and minima of
log aβi
σi
when βi ∈ [βi, β¯i] and413
σi ∈ [σi, σ¯i]. Then note that log aβ¯i < log
a
β i
< log aβi . The upper bound is found by noting that if414
0 < log aβi then
log aβ i
σi
<
log aβi
σi
and if 0 > log aβi then
log aβ i
σi
<
log aβi
σ¯i
. The lower bound is found by415
noting that if 0 < log a
β¯i
then
log aβ i
σi
>
log a
β¯i
σ¯i
and if 0 > log a
β¯i
then
log aβ i
σi
>
log a
β¯i
σi
.416
Finally, note that it is trivial to construct a function which takes a different value above and417
below zero, e.g. f1(x)−| f1(x) |c1 +
f1(x)+| f1(x) |
c2
is equal to 2 f1(x)c2 above zero and
2 f1(x)
c1
below zero. This418
concludes the proof.419
Proof of Equations in Section 3420
The failure probability bounds for a parallel system with unknown dependencies and lognor-421
mally distributed load and strength, Eqn. (19), can be derived by applying the natural interval422
extension of the Fréchet inequality for the intersection, Eqn. (3), to the natural interval extension423
of the failure probability for a lognormal component, Eqn. (16).424
Eqn. (20), the series system with unknown dependencies and lognormally distributed load and425
strength is derived in the same way, except this time the union Fréchet inequality (Eqn. (2)) is426
applied.427
Eqn. (21) and Eqn. (22) can be derived in the same way by applying Eqn. (1) and Eqn. (4),428
respectively.429
The derivation of Eqn. (23) (single component with power law load and log normal fragility)430
is more complex, due to repeated variables (KH) (Moore et al. 2009). Firstly, note that P f =431
H (βi) exp (KHσi )
2
2 = k1 exp (−KH log βi + 12K2Hσ2i ). Recall that k1 > 0, KH > 0, β > 0432
and σ > 0. Note that P f is monotonic in k1, σi and βi, so our task is simply to find433
maxKH k¯1 exp (−KH log βi + 12K2H σ¯2i ) and minKH kl exp (−KH log β¯i + 12K2Hσ2i ).434
The function k1 exp (−KH log βi + 12K2Hσ2i ) is quadratic in KH and has a global minima in KH435
at KH = log βσ2 . ClearlymaxKH k¯1 exp (−KH log βi + 12K2H σ¯2i ) takes its maximum value at K¯H or KH .436
Elementary interval analysis reveals that kl exp (−KH log β¯i + 12K2Hσ2i ) > kl exp (−K¯H log β¯i + 12KH2σ2i ).437
However in reality KH and KH cannot appear in the same expression, as they represent specific438
values of the same quantity. A tighter bound is obtained by checking if KH < log β¯iσi2 < K¯H . If this439
inequality holds then the minimum occurs at KH = log β¯iσi2 . Otherwise we must check which of K¯H440
and KH minimises the failure probability. Then the remaining results can be obtained by applying441
the union or intersection Fréchet inequalities, or rare event approximation as appropriate.442
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TABLE 1. Input parameters for the modified Sandia National Laboratories containment test case.
Load and Strength Mean Value,
[µ,µ¯]
Coefficient of Variation
Concrete tensile strength, Fc [4.3, 4.5] 0.2
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Radius, R 5537.5 0.2
Concrete area, Ac 312.85 0.2
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TABLE 2. Input parameters for Sandia National Laboratories containment test case with additive
component strengths.
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Fig. 2. A comparison of extreme fragility curves enclosed within the fragility probability box. The
parameters for the plotted probability box were µ = log β = 1ms−2, µ¯ = log β¯ = 1.2ms−2, σ = 0.2
and σ¯ = 0.5.
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Fig. 3. Demonstration of failure probability calculation with Eqn. (16). The lognormal probability
density functions for the stress and strength are shown. The shaded area represents the integrand
in Eqn. (15), which yields the failure probability P f = 0.14. The example parameter values for the
plotted distributions were βl = 1ms−2, σl = 1, βi = 3ms−2 and σi = 0.2.
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Fig. 4. Demonstration of failure probability calculation with Eqn. (18). The lognormal probability
density functions for the stress and strength are shown. The shaded area represents the integrand
in Eqn. (15), which yields the failure probability P f = 0.12. The example parameter values for the
plotted distributions were KH = 2, k1 = 1(ms−2)KH , βi = 3ms−2 and σi = 0.2.
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Fig. 5. Probability box representing the fragility curve of the series system, computed analytically.
For comparison, the results of a double loop Monte Carlo simulation are shown, which was
computed by making 100 epistemic samples and 1000 aleatory samples.
